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.
The "tradition républicaine" stressed also the political direction of policy. It implied the primacy of political will on the markets. Economic policy had then a strongly "voluntarist" element. The republican tradition legitimated a centralisation of power, also in the area of economic and monetary matters. So was the Banque de France a part of the "circuit du Trésor", a far cry from an independent central bank 4 . 2 So is the French civil law system rather designed to be an instrument of power of the state. This contrasts with the Anglo-Saxon civil law system where the protection of the citizens against the government is at the core. 3 It went together with a French emphasis on institutions. This was also very typical of Monnet's approach to European integration: "Rien n'est possible sans les hommes, rien n'est durable sans les institutions" (Monnet, 1976, 412) . 4 In an article of 1992, Christian Noyer, then at the French Treasury, wrote about central bank independance as "l'exception au principe démocratique" (Noyer, 1992, 17) .
Decentralisation not only applied to the political organisation of the country, such as the federal structure of the state. It was also a basic principle of the organisation of economic policy. So was the central bank responsible for monetary policy, but not for banking supervision. The market economy itself is a decentralised structure, which goes easily along with Germany's federal state.
Germany's economic system in the postwar period can best be characterised as a "social market economy", combining the principle of freedom in the market with that of social balance. In contrast to "laissez-faire" capitalism, the concept of the social market economy requires above all a clear legal and political regulatory framework, or "Ordnungsrahmen" (Tietmeyer, 1999, 6) . Ordo-liberal economists emphasise the interdependence between the economic order and all other forms of order (i.e. legal, social and political).
During the war, "ordo-liberal" ideas were developed by a number of economists known as the Freiburg School under the leadership of Walter Eucken
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. In its emphasis on historical and institutional aspects of economic problems, the ordo-liberal approach drew to a significant extent on the ideas and approach of the historical school (Hutchison, 1979, 435) . They became very influential in the post-war period. Ludwig Erhard, the first Economics minister, and an economics professor himself, was very much influenced by them. Ordo-liberal ideas inspired the economic reforms of June 1948, which restored the market economy 11 . When trying to understand the development of economic thought it is helpful to focus on important historical events. After the war, the reconstruction was such a crucial event. However, the experiences of France and Germany were different, contributing to different economic paradigms.
In France, the recovery was strongly associated with "Le Plan". In Germany, the recovery, "Das Wirtschaftswunder" (the economic miracle), was associated with the return of the free market economy.
According to the advocates of the social market economy, a strong state is necessary, but one with limited functions. The fundamental task of the state is "rule-setting": to set the rules for economic processes, monitor compliance with them, and punish infringements. The aim of these rules is to set a framework that permits the highest possible degree of freedom and ensures lasting maintenance of effective competition. Important elements are clearly defined property rights and an active competition policy.
A constitutive element of the social market economy is monetary stability (Tietmeyer, 1999, 138) .
Monetary stability is important for economic reasons, as inflation damages the steering function of the price mechanism and creates uncertainty, which hurts investment. It is also important for social reasons, as inflation causes a redistribution of income, to the disadvantage of the weaker groups who cannot protect themselves. Memories of this were still vivid in Germany, with the hyperinflation of the 1920s. The task of ensuring monetary stability became the responsibility of the, independent, Bundesbank 12 . However, there is also an affinity with the German "federalist" approach of preferring decentralised and compartmentalised structures (Tietmeyer, 1999, 165 .)
The more Keynesian tendency in Germany, with Karl Schiller as an important representative, put more emphasis on active government policies. Schiller's ideal of economic policy was to combine the market economy (the "Freiburg imperative") with active macroeconomic policies (the "Keynesian message"). This tendency was influential at the end of the 1960s and the early 1970s, when the social democrats participated in the government, with Willy Brandt as their leader and with Schiller as economics minister.
The federalist German philosophy went along with a positive view towards European integration and the transfer of sovereignty to supranational European institutions. Moreover, policy was dominated by the belief that European security and Franco-German reconciliation were the most vital of all interests for Germany. 12 During the discussions on the Bundesbank law of 1957, Erhard supported the independence of the Bundesbank, while Adenauer was more reserved (Marsh, 1992, 167) . See also Bibow, 2002.
THE CREATION OF THE COMMUNITIES
The real start of the process of European integration can be traced back to the Schuman Declaration of May 1950, which provided the basis for the European Coal and Steel Community.
The Declaration stated clearly that: "The solidarity in production will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible ... this proposal will build the first concrete foundation of a European federation which is indispensable to the preservation of peace".
In October 1950 a new French plan followed, the Pleven Plan, which aimed to establish a Groeben, 1979, 496) . Erhard, the Economics Minister, was against the European common market. He feared that a European customs union would hinder a world-wide liberalisation of trade. However, Adenauer overrode his objections.
For the German government the new European economic system to be created was of utmost importance. One of the main German aims was that the European common market would have the same economic order as the one in the Federal Republic, based on the principles of a market economy and a liberal trade policy. The Germans feared that interactions with more etatist and planified systems, through the common market, could imperil the consistency of their own economic system (von der Groeben, 1979, 496 This was both for political reasons (the aversion against supranational institutions, especially, but not only, among the Gaullists) and for economic reasons (fear, both from businessmen and trade unionists, for German competition, which could endanger France's industry and the "acquis social").
During the negotiations, the French government was in first instance concerned about the Euratom treaty. France also favoured a greater role for the State in economic life and proposed the idea of planning on a European scale (Marjolin, 1986, 287) . Moreover, the French government was very concerned that France was not in a position to engage in competition on equal terms. It was therefore in favour of harmonisation of legislation which affected the competitive position, especially social legislation. The French argued further that agriculture had to be included in the common market and that France had extra costs, due to her responsibilities in her overseas territories.
Looking then at the Rome Treaties from an economic thought and constitutional perspective, the European Atomic Energy Community, bears a heavier French imprint, with its sectoral approach, while the European Economic Community, with the abolition of barriers which hindered the free movement of goods, services, labour and capital in the common market and strong emphasis on competition policy, has a stronger German sounding 13 . The chapter on competition policy was very comprehensive. The French obtained the setting-up of the common agricultural policy and the association of the overseas territories. The social dimension was rather limited, as Germany was concerned that it could hinder the functioning of the market economy.
13 Free movement of capital was more limited, under French pressure. For an analysis of the Rome treaty, see also Streit & Mussler, 1998 .
EMU APPEARS ON THE SCENE

The Hague summit and the Werner plan
During the 1960s the common market project, with the abolition of tariffs and quota's, was realised.
However, no important new attempts at European integration were undertaken. Change appeared at the end of the 1960s, when the customs union was being completed and the unease with the Bretton-Woods system was growing. The Werner Report first presented a general picture of economic and monetary union. EMU implied that "the principal decisions of economic policy will be taken at Community level and therefore that the necessary powers will be transferred from the national plane to the Community plane" (Werner Report, 26). The Report proposed that two new Community institutions should be created: a centre of decision-making for economic policy and a Community system for the central banks. However, the Report did not elaborate very much on the institutional structure of EMU and did not distinguish clearly between a single currency and a system of irrevocably fixed exchange rates (Baer and Padoa-Schioppa, 1988, 54 ). An important reason herefore were Franco-German divergencies on the conception of economic policy and of European integration. So could Clappier, the French member of the Committee, not accept anything on the institutional level. However, in practice, he proved to be rather independent-minded (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999, 107) .
The Report proposed to attain EMU in three stages. However, it did not lay down a precise timetable for the different stages. Rather it wanted to maintain a measure of flexibility, while concentrating on the first phase. There were heated discussions about the priorities on the path to EMU. It would lead to the classic description of the debate between the "monetarists" and the "economists". The "economists", led by Germany, emphasised policy co-ordination, while the "monetarists", with France, argued for priority for the narrowing of exchange rate fluctuations (Werner, 1991) . The compromise solution was that there had to be "parallel progress" in both areas.
Immediately after its publication, the Werner Report was heavily criticised by the orthodox gaullists in France. Their criticism centred on the supranational elements of the Report. It induced a change in the policy of the French government, contributing to a dilution of the proposals of the Report. In particular, the creation of new Community institutions was dropped.
Chart 2 -Inflation in France and Germany
The first attempt at monetary unification was not very successful: exchange rates were volatile and policy coordination remained limited. This was not only due to the unstable international environment (the collapse of the Bretton-Woods system and the oil crisis), but also because national governments were still strongly attached to their monetary sovereignty and the pursuit of national economic objectives, herein comforted by the then influential theory of the Phillips curve (Maes, 2002) . In Germany, priority was given to the fight against inflation, while in France economic growth was considered a more important objective.
Fundamentally, this first attempt at monetary union failed because of different views in France and Germany, both on European integration, especially a French refusal to transfer sovereignty to supranational European institutions, and regarding economic policy conceptions, more stabilityoriented policies in Germany and more activist economic policies in France.
The European Monetary System
At German dominance of the ERM was an important topic of academic research. The results hereof were somewhat less equivocal. So argue Gros and Thygesen (1998, 177) that Germany had a strong influence on the other countries, but there was also a weak influence the other way around. See also Fratianni and von Hagen (1992) .
. It implied that, in order to avoid further devaluations, he had to pursue a more orthodox economic policy, the "politique de rigueur"
18
A growing consensus on stability oriented policies
The oil shock of 1973, and the ensuing stagflation, were of fundamental importance to induce changes in the conceptions of French economic policy-makers. They showed very clearly the openness of the French economy and the vulnerability to external developments (Patat, 1992, 8) .
The oil shock was a, more or less fatal, blow to the French planning experience. French policymakers became more and more aware that there were limits to activist policies, and that France had to take into account the external constraint.
During the second half of the 1970s, under the prime ministership of Raymond Barre, French economic policies became more stability-oriented. The exchange rate was a crucial element in the strategy to instill discipline on the French economy. Barre also pushed through measures to liberalise prices. This reorientation of French economic policy was an important element why German policy-makers consented to the creation of the EMS. The EMS can then be considered as a case of "parallel progress", towards exchange rate stability and stability-oriented policies, as requested in the Werner Report. In this respect then can Mitterrand's initial economic policies be regarded as a last gasp of the traditional French interventionist policies, running against the external constraint.
These changes in economic policy conceptions were supported by new economic theories. The "Monetarist counter-revolution" had questioned the Keynesian framework. It led to thrilling debates, initially mainly in the academic world. In a first stage, discussions centred on the determination of nominal demand, monetarists emphasising the money supply and not budgetary policy, as the main determinant of effective demand. In a second stage, the attention shifted 17 See Saunier (2002) for an analysis of the early years of the Mitterrand presidency, based on the Archives of the Presidency. Mitterrand clearly asked for the alternative scenario, with the imposition of tariffs, to be investigated. 18 So changed the Mauroy government the wage-setting procedures, including the abolishment of automatic wage indexation.
towards the functioning of the labour market, with the monetarists attacking the Phillips curve (Friedman, 1968) . With the rational expectations hypothesis, the possibilities of policy-makers to steer the economy were even more strongly questioned, as the behaviour of economic agents may change in response to a change in policy regime (Lucas, 1976) . Gradually then a consensus developed, moving away from active demand management policies and towards a medium-term orientation, emphasising structural, supply-side oriented policies
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. A core ingredient of this new strategy was that monetary policy should be geared to price stability, and conducted by an independent central bank.
Multilateral fora, like the European Union, the OECD, the BIS, and the IMF, greatly contributed to the dissemination of these new ideas on stability oriented policies
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. Senior French and German officials would meet often, not only bilaterally, but also in these international fora. This contributed to a growing consensus, also among French economic policy-makers, on "sound money" policies.
An important illustration is Jacques de Larosière, the Governor of the Banque de France from 1987 to 1993, who, previously, had been Managing Director of the IMF.
The emergence of this consensus on stability-oriented policies took also the heat out of the old "monetarist" -"economist" debate about the sequencing of the monetary integration process:
whether priority should be given to exchange rate stability or policy coordination. Parallel progress, as requested in the Werner Report, became natural. Policy-makers in both Germany and France followed stability-oriented policies
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. For French policy-makers the exchange rate, the '"franc fort", became an important anchor for their economic policies.
21 During most of the 1990s, inflation was even higher in Germany than in France (see graph 2), something which was naturally also related to German unification.
THE MAASTRICHT TREATY PROCESS
The relaunching of the monetary union project
While French policy-makers where convinced of the importance of stability-oriented policies, they remained unhappy with the German dominance in the EMS. During Franco-German negotiations, Jacques Attali even called the German mark the "force de frappe allemande".
French policymakers developed then, more or less simultaneously, different strategies to cope with the asymmetry in the EMS: (1) In early 1988, debates about Europe's monetary future accelerated. In a memorandum of January 1988, the French Finance Minister, Edouard Balladur, argued that the exchange rate mechanism still had some important defects, notably its asymmetry. Although, the Balladur Memorandum focused on adapting the way in which the EMS functioned, it also argued that it was 22 To the great surprise of senior French Commission officials, for whom this was a complete change of direction. Delors was certainly aware of the implications. One of his close confidants, Padoa-Schioppa, was the father of the "inconsistent quartet". necessary to reflect on further institutional steps in the monetary construction of Europe. At the end, it also raised the issue of the creation of a single currency (Balladur, 1988, 20 ).
Balladur's Memorandum found a perceptive ear in Germany, not at the Bundesbank or the Finance
Ministry, but at the Foreign Ministry. Several factors converged in making economic and monetary union a key theme for Genscher (Smets, Maes and Michielsen, 2000, 67) : (1) it fitted in perfectly with Genscher's pro-European convictions. Genscher wanted to strengthen the process of European integration, which he considered as still fragile after the Euro-sclerosis of the first half of the 1980s. Moreover, he sensed that, with Gorbachev, things were changing in the East; (2) it was a popular theme among the business community in Germany, a natural constituency of Genscher's liberal democratic party; (3) Genscher was also influenced by French complaints about the German dominance of the EMS. As such, Genscher was confronted with the issue of the "political sustainability" of the EMS: could the stance of monetary policy be determined by one country in a Community where, in principle, decisions are taken together. In February 1988, Genscher, in his personal capacity, published a Memorandum wherein he argued strongly for a European Monetary
Union and a European Central Bank (Schönfelder & Thiel, 1996, 29) .
At that time, early in 1988, Helmut Kohl was still quite open to the issue of monetary union. On the one hand, he was sensitive to the arguments of Stoltenberg that EMU was only possible if a sufficient degree of convergence was achieved (coronation theory). On the other hand, he was also sensitive to the arguments of the advocates of EMU, like Genscher, but also Mitterrand, for whom he had a high esteem and who often complained about the asymmetry of the EMS.
Moreover, Kohl gradually realised that EMU was unavoidable if he wanted to realise his vision of a "United States of Europe", a recurrent theme in his speeches at that time. Of crucial importance was the Franco-German bilateral summit at Evian, early in June 1988, when Kohl and Mitterrand decided to push ahead with EMU.
Further progress was made at the Hanover Summit. The European Council confirmed the objective of economic and monetary union and decided to entrust to a Committee the task of studying and proposing "concrete stages leading towards this union", a very shrewd limitation of the mandate of the Committee, as it was not asked to analyse whether EMU was desirable or not.
The Committee was chaired by Jacques Delors, who had the confidence of Kohl and Mitterrand, and, as a former finance minister, the technical expertise. The governors of the central banks -in a personal capacity -were also on the Committee. Delors wanted them to be members, both because of their expertise and because this would bind them to the monetary union project. In a first reaction, Karl-Otto Pöhl, the president of the Bundesbank, even considered refusing to serve on the Committee.
The Delors Report
The Initially, the relation between Delors and Pöhl in the Committee was rather tense. However, the crucial aim of Delors was to get a unanimous Report. So he took a low profile and focused on seeking out a consensus in the Committee. Pöhl took a "fundamentalist" position and emphasised the new monetary order which had to be created: "Above all agreement must exist that stability of the value of money is the indispensable prerequisite for the achievement of other goals. Particular importance will therefore attach to the principles on which a European monetary order should be based" (Pöhl, 1988, 132) . He argued for price stability as the prime objective of monetary policy, which had to be conducted by an independent central bank. Pöhl further emphasised the "indivisibility of monetary policy", that decisions should be taken either at the national level or by a common central bank.
The fundamentalist approach would be deeply influential in the Delors Report and inspire a number of principles that would also figure prominently in the Maastricht treaty (Padoa-Schioppa, 1994, 9) . participate in the monetary union. The combination of the convergence criteria with a fixed date proved to be a very powerful stimulus for the convergence process.
There were also major Franco-German debates on the constitutional structure of EMU. The coordination process for budgetary policy and the responsibility for exchange rate policy were the topic of some of the most tense discussions during the intergovernmental conference. France proposed a "gouvernement économique", whereby the European Council would provide for broad orientations for economic policy, including monetary policy. This provoked a strong clash with Germany, for whom the independence of the European Central Bank was not negotiable.
However, the Germans were also convinced of the necessity of a coordination of other economic policies, especially budgetary policy, as they determine the environment in which monetary policy has to function 25 . Agreement was only reached after intense negotiations, including secret bilateral discussions between the French and the Germans.
These discussions showed that the Franco-German controversies touched on the "meta-beliefs" concerning the organisation of economic policy: centralised or decentralised. They concerned fundamental issues of a constitutional nature and of legitimacy. For Germany, to agree on the establishment of EMU, "the independence of the European Central Bank was a conditio sine qua non" (Tietmeyer, 1999, 139, original italics) . 25 Senior German policy-makers admit that there was a kind of contradiction in the German negotiation position, with Germany being against a "gouvernement économique" but in favour of restraints on national budgetary policies. Waigel's political problems in Bavaria were mentioned as an explanatory factor.
CONCLUSION
There were significant differences in ideas and economic policy-making in France and Germany in the post-war period. In Germany, the economic order was based on the concept of the social market economy, while in France the state played a greater role in economic life and pursued more activist economic policies. These differences in economic thought were to a large extent based on more fundamental underlying differences in "meta-beliefs". The "tradition républicaine" in France stressed the sovereign nation as the source of legitimacy and, consequently, the political direction of economic policy. The post-war German federal system stressed decentralisation and a division of power. There were regular recurrences of these Franco-German debates. In the beginning the FrancoGerman debates went to the core of economic policy-making. They concerned the basic mechanisms of economic coordination: planning or the market. Gradually, however, planning, fell into demise. Important factors hereby were the stagflation of the 1970s and the growing openness of the economies. Also, activist Keynesian policies lost support, due to the failure of demand management policies, both at the international level, like the coordinated expansion of 1978, and at the national level, like the Mitterrand experiment in France in the early 1980s. Gradually, a consensus developed on "sound money" policies: stability oriented, medium-term, economic policies. Moreover, with this consensus, "parallel progress" towards exchange rate stability and policy coordination, as requested in the Werner Report, became natural. It took the heat out of the traditonal "monetarist" -"economist" debate on the sequence of events leading to monetary unification.
One can discern some interesting parallels between the negotiations for the Rome Treaties and the Maastricht treaty. The parallels were probably strongest on the German side. In both cases the main technical actor, the Economics Ministry in the 1950s and the Bundesbank in the 1980s and 1990s, was cautious about the move towards European integration. However, in both cases the Chancellor overrode the objections of the "technicians", because of foreign policy motives, whereby the desire to further the process of European integration and to strengthen the Franco-German relationship were important elements.
While the German Chancellor in both cases decided to push for European integration, he left his negotiators a large room of manoeuvre as regards the kind of European economic constitution to be created. So took Pöhl a "fundamentalist" approach in the discussions in the Delors Committee.
He argued for price stability as the prime objective of monetary policy, which had to be conducted by an independent central bank. This view would permeate the Delors Report and the Maastricht treaty, just as the creation and functioning of a competitive market permeated the Rome treaty.
The most difficult discussions during the Maastricht treaty negotiations concerned the French proposal for a "Gouvernement économique". This went to the core of the French and German meta-beliefs concerning the constitutional architecture of EMU, related to the division of powers between the different authorities, especially the independence of the central bank and the political direction of economic policy. Basically, the German view prevailed, as the transfer of monetary sovereignty to the European Central Bank was only acceptable for Germany if the German model was followed.
The convergence of French and German economic policy conceptions was an indispensable condition for the realisation of EMU. However, differences still remain. France typically tends to favour a more discretionary approach, while Germany rather emphasises the importance of rules.
The discussions on the creation and functioning of the Stability and Growth Pact were a typical example of this.
